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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 12-2873 
___________ 
 
CHUNG-HUA CHEN, a/k/a 
Zhen Hua Chen, 
                                     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Respondent 
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency No. A072-848-835)  
Immigration Judge: Robert P. Owens 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 10, 2013 
 
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion Filed:  July 24, 2013) 
 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
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  Petitioner Chung-Hua Chen filed this Petition for Review of the decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his applications for political asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(“CAT”). Because substantial evidence supported the Immigration Judge’s finding that 
petitioner was not credible, we will deny the Petition for Review.  
I. 
Petitioner is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China. On December 
31, 1993, petitioner arrived in Miami, Florida. He was placed in deportation proceedings 
as an alien not in possession of valid travel and entry documents. Petitioner filed his first 
application for asylum on May 20, 1994, based on persecution under China’s family 
planning policies. On October 25, 1994, petitioner was ordered excluded and deported in 
absentia because he and his counsel failed to appear at a hearing before the Immigration 
Judge (“IJ”). In December 1998, petitioner filed a motion to reopen and reconsider 
through new counsel. The IJ denied this motion and reaffirmed that petitioner had 
abandoned his claims to relief. Petitioner filed his second application for asylum on May 
16, 2008, also based on persecution under China’s family planning policies. Petitioner 
then filed a joint motion to reopen the case, which the IJ granted on June 18, 2008. On 
August 7, 2009, petitioner submitted an Affidavit of New Circumstances explaining that 
he was seeking asylum because, as a recent convert to Christianity, he feared persecution 
in China on the basis of his religion. During the 2009 hearing, counsel for petitioner 
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stated that petitioner had decided to drop his family-planning claim and to instead seek 
asylum on the basis of his religious beliefs. 
The IJ issued its written decision on August 11, 2010, finding that petitioner was 
not credible, denying his applications for relief, and ordering him removed to China. The 
IJ noted that the versions of events told in petitioner’s first and second asylum 
applications were inconsistent with one another and with the versions told in petitioner’s 
Pre-Hearing Brief, Supplemental Declaration, and Affidavit of New Circumstances. In 
total, the IJ explained that  
many crucial aspects of the [petitioner’s] story changed over these five 
versions: the dates of his marriage and his son’s birth; the number of his 
wife’s pregnancies and whether there was a forced abortion; whether he and 
his wife were warned about the insertion of an IUD [intrauterine device] or 
sterilization; the month when officials came for [his wife] Bi Ying to insert 
the IUD; whether officials were aware that the [petitioner] and his wife had 
secretly removed the IUD; whether the [petitioner] and his family fled to 
the mountains; the date he was last present in China, which still does not fit 
the timeline created by his statements and documents in the record; whether 
he was beaten and arrested by officials; whether his wife was at home when 
he was arrested; and whether the [petitioner] fears being sterilized. 
 
The IJ also considered aspects of petitioner’s religious-beliefs claim implausible and 
found that petitioner had failed to explain the inconsistencies, omissions, and implausible 
aspects of his testimony and submissions.  
The BIA affirmed the findings of the IJ and dismissed petitioner’s appeal on June 
5, 2012. The BIA found the IJ properly arrived at an adverse credibility determination 
and that petitioner had failed to meaningfully address the IJ’s credibility concerns. Since 
the BIA found petitioner did not satisfy his burden of establishing a credible claim for 
asylum, the BIA also determined that petitioner could not satisfy his higher burden of 
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proof for withholding of removal. Lastly, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision to deny 
petitioner’s application for protection under the CAT because petitioner failed to show 
that he would more likely than not be tortured by Chinese authorities if he were to return 
to China.  
Petitioner timely filed this Petition for Review.  
II. 
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We 
review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence, and we review the BIA’s legal 
determinations de novo, subject to principles of Chevron deference. Briseno-Flores v. 
Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). “Adverse credibility determinations are factual 
findings subject to substantial evidence review.” Zheng v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 379, 381 
(3d Cir. 2005).1
                                              
1 Under the REAL ID Act of 2005,  
 
[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a 
trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, 
or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the 
applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or 
witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not 
under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements 
were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the 
consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the 
reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any 
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an 
inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s 
claim, or any other relevant factor. There is no presumption of credibility, 
however, if no adverse credibility determination is explicitly made, the 
applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of credibility on 
appeal.  
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“The ‘final order’ to be reviewed is usually that of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, but when the BIA simply states ‘that it affirms the IJ’s decision for the reasons 
set forth in that decision, . . . the IJ’s opinion effectively becomes the BIA’s, and, 
accordingly, a court must review the IJ’s decision.” Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 
155 (3d Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2001)).  
“Ordinarily, we will affirm the IJ’s decision if it is supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. This deferential 
standard dictates that the IJ’s findings ‘must be upheld unless the evidence not only 
supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.’” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Abdille v. 
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001)). “Although we generally defer to the IJ’s 
inferences, ‘deference is not due where findings and conclusions are based on inferences 
or presumptions that are not reasonably grounded in the record, viewed as a whole.’” 
Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Balasubramanrim v. 
INS, 143 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1998)). We review due process claims de novo. Chong v. 
Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 386 (3d Cir. 2001). 
III. 
  Petitioner contends the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not supported 
by substantial evidence because (A) petitioner was prejudiced by the conduct of counsel 
who represented him in his first application for asylum, (B) the IJ erroneously relied upon 
                                                                                                                                                  
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). It is undisputed that the REAL ID Act applies to 
petitioner’s current asylum application.  
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minor inconsistencies that were reasonably explained by petitioner, and (C) the IJ did not 
address petitioner’s religious-beliefs claim separately from his family-planning claim and 
improperly relied on conjecture. We will address each of petitioner’s arguments in turn. 
A. 
 Petitioner contends that his prior counsel provided him with ineffective assistance 
in the submission of his first application for asylum; therefore, he asserts, we should not 
permit any inconsistencies between that application and subsequent applications and 
submissions to affect his credibility.  
But even if we ignore discrepancies between the first application and later 
submissions, we agree with the IJ that “substantial and material aspects of [petitioner’s] 
claim . . . were missing from his original application.”2
                                              
2 Petitioner’s brief asserts that because petitioner testified that he did not recognize his 
first application for asylum, petitioner may not have known what his attorney wrote on it. 
But petitioner only testified that he did not remember the first application for asylum, 
explaining that “[i]t’s been [sic] long time.” A.R. 194. During the hearing, petitioner did 
not contend that he did not help write or approve of the first application or that its 
contents were fabricated. Petitioner also testified that his handwriting and signature were 
on the application. 
 The IJ found that before petitioner 
allowed his lawyer to submit his first application for asylum, petitioner should have 
noticed that the application omitted his wife’s second pregnancy and forced abortion. The 
IJ also found that ineffective assistance of counsel would “not account for the 
discrepancies in [petitioner’s] second application and subsequent statements,” for which 
petitioner had obtained new counsel. For instance, neither petitioner’s first application 
nor his second application mentioned his claimed beating, arrest, and detention by 
Chinese officials. These events were mentioned for the first time in petitioner’s Pre-
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Hearing Brief.  
We agree with the IJ’s analysis. Because the aforementioned omissions were not 
attributable to any ineffective assistance of counsel, it was appropriate for the IJ to 
consider them in arriving at the adverse credibility determination.3
B. 
 
Alternatively, petitioner argues that any inconsistencies in his testimony and 
submissions were minor and did not form an adequate basis for an adverse credibility 
ruling. We disagree both with petitioner’s legal assertion that the IJ may not consider 
minor inconsistencies and with petitioner’s factual assertion that the inconsistencies on 
which the IJ relied were minor. 
Under the REAL ID Act, a trier of fact may, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, base a credibility determination on “any inaccuracies or falsehoods . . . , 
without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of 
the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 
                                              
3 In its brief, the Government argues that petitioner has not complied with the necessary 
procedures for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To assert ineffective 
assistance of counsel in a removal proceeding, an alien must follow certain procedural 
formalities and show he was prejudiced by counsel. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988) (detailing the procedural requirements to assert an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim); Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“[A]n alien claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings must, in 
addition to showing that his lawyer committed unprofessional errors, show that there was 
a ‘reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different if the error[s] . . . had 
not occurred.’” (second and third alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 362 (3d Cir. 2006))). Because we find the IJ’s credibility 
determination supported by substantial evidence, and not attributable to any ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we need not consider whether petitioner properly raised an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
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162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]n IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making 
an adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ 
establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.” (quoting § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii))).  
The omissions apparent in petitioner’s early applications for asylum—e.g., the 
facts of petitioner’s arrest and beating and his wife’s forced abortion—provide strong 
support for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. In fact, we faced a similar situation 
in the pre-REAL ID Act case of Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2004). In Xie, an 
alien sought asylum on the basis of China’s family-planning policies but failed to 
mention in his written asylum application that his wife had been forcibly sterilized. Id. at 
243. We found that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by 
substantial evidence, noting that “[i]f indeed [the petitioner’s] wife had been sterilized, 
this would be such a traumatic event in both his and his wife’s life that [it would be] 
implausible and incredible that this . . . would not have been included in the I-589 
application.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (finding material alterations in applicant’s account of persecution, including 
when applicant presents different accounts of mistreatment in successive asylum 
petitions, sufficient to support an adverse credibility determination in a pre-REAL ID Act 
case). 
Petitioner also contends the IJ did not consider his explanations for his 
inconsistencies. In particular, petitioner argues that he added the facts of his arrest and 
beating to his Pre-Hearing Brief in order to address the new burden created by In re J-S-, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (Att’y Gen. 2008). But although petitioner’s explanation makes clear 
9 
 
why he added these facts to his submission, it still does not clarify why he omitted such 
relevant and likely memorable events in his first and second applications. In short, his 
explanation would not compel a reasonable factfinder to find that he is credible.4
C. 
  
Petitioner argues the IJ failed to separately address his religious-beliefs claim from 
his family-planning claim. With respect to his religious-beliefs claim, petitioner takes 
issue with the IJ’s conclusions that (1) it is implausible that petitioner would have tried to 
persuade his wife to attend an underground church and spread the gospel in China, since 
he knew it could result in his wife’s persecution; and (2) it is implausible that petitioner 
would not have told his pastor or other members of his church, including five witnesses 
from China and Taiwan who attended his merits hearing, about his wife’s arrest by 
Chinese authorities for practicing Christianity.  
We agree with petitioner that the IJ’s first finding of implausibility was based on 
improper speculation. See Zheng, 417 F.3d at 382 (explaining a credibility determination 
based on implausibility must be grounded in the record to avoid speculation and 
conjecture). The IJ’s assumption that petitioner would necessarily prioritize his wife’s 
safety over his faith was not grounded in the record; indeed, it contradicts petitioner’s 
statements that he fears persecution upon return to China because he intends to continue 
practicing Christianity there.  
                                              
4 Petitioner’s brief also suggests that petitioner’s attorney did not know the requirements 
for an asylum claim and may have failed to initially question petitioner regarding his 
arrest. But as the BIA explained, “[b]elated statements in the appeal brief that speculate 
reasons” why Petitioner did not mention his arrest and beating “are not evidence.”  
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But the IJ’s second finding of implausibility was grounded in the record. Petitioner 
testified that he and his Chinese acquaintances “all talk about” the problems that would 
be created by practicing Christianity in China. A.R. 207. And when asked why he only 
told one person about his wife’s arrest, petitioner explained that he chose his confidant 
“because he’s my friend,” but then also stated that the members of his church were his 
“friends.” Id. This testimony was sufficient for the IJ to conclude that it was implausible 
that petitioner would not have told his pastor or any of the other witnesses about his 
wife’s arrest in China for practicing Christianity.  
Additionally, whether or not we are “troubled by some of the reasons underlying 
the IJ’s adverse credibility finding[,] . . . we are bound to uphold the IJ’s decision if it is 
supported by substantial evidence, and may do so even if we reject some of its bases.” 
Zheng, 417 F.3d at 382. In finding that petitioner was not credible, the IJ did not rely 
solely on the fact that certain aspects of petitioner’s testimony were implausible, but also 
on petitioner’s inconsistencies with respect to his family-planning claim. As previously 
stated, the REAL ID Act permitted the IJ to consider any inconsistency in petitioner’s 
statements and submissions regardless of whether it went to the heart of his claim for 
asylum. We agree with the BIA that in this case, 
[w]here . . . discrepancies went to the heart of one aspect of the asylum 
claim, such discrepancies can undermine the credibility of another aspect of 
the applicant’s asylum claim, which here the applicant has based on his 
religious conversion during the pendency of his exclusion proceedings and 
which was wholly dependent on the veracity of his claim that he will 
continue to practice Christianity and convert others in China at the risk of 
persecution . . . . 
 
Given the inconsistencies in petitioner’s submissions with respect to his family-
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planning claim, and the implausibility of one aspect of his religious-beliefs claim, a 
reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find petitioner credible. Therefore, the IJ 
acted within its discretion in determining that, under the totality of the circumstances, 
petitioner was not credible.  
IV. 
We find the IJ’s adverse credibility determination supported by substantial 
evidence. As such, petitioner’s claim for withholding of removal is foreclosed. See Chen 
v. Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that withholding of removal 
carries a higher burden of proof than asylum). We also find that petitioner has not 
satisfied his burden of showing that he would more likely than not be tortured by Chinese 
authorities if he were to return to China. See Zheng, 417 F.3d at 383 (finding that an 
adverse credibility determination on petitioner’s asylum claim precluded CAT claim 
based on the same factual circumstances).  
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the Petition for Review.  
